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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes the impact of deregulation on board structure by comparing the boards of 
electric utilities before and after the passage of the Energy Policy Act (EPACT) using a unique 
hand-collected data set. The primary focus of the study is on changes to the boards' character, 
determined by the background and expertise of the directors. The results show that electric 
utilities change their board structure in response to their new operating environment. Boards are 
smaller and more independent in the later period. Also, even though the number of outside 
directors stays the same, there are two notable changes in the character of these directors. The 
number of executives from large firms and the number of directors with political backgrounds are 
both significantly greater after the passage of EPACT. Overall, the results are consistent with 
Williamson's hypothesis that firms will change the composition and character of their board in 
response to a change in the firm's operating environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
here is an increasing interest in how corporate boards evolve over time as a way to shed light on the 
factors that shape board composition. Some progress has been made, but many unexplained aspects 
still remain (Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007). To date, two components of board composition 
have been emphasized in the literature; namely, board size and level of independence (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 
2008; Link, Netter, & Yang, 2008). By contrast, a third component - the character of the individual directors - has 
received little attention (Klein, 1998). 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) assert that "the composition and character of the board of directors will reflect the 
hazards facing the residual claimants." Extending this theory, Williamson (1983) hypothesizes that a change in the 
firm's operating environment will result in a change in the composition and character of the board of directors. The 
removal and relaxation of regulations in the electric utility industry provide an opportunity to test this hypothesis. 
 
Earlier tests of Williamson's substitution hypothesis focused on differences in a firm's board composition 
(the relative mix of employee and non-employee directors, or insiders and outsiders) and produced mixed results 
(Mayers, Shivdasani, & Smith, 1997; Brickley & James, 1987). The underlying assumption of these tests is that 
boards have a single function, which is to monitor managers, and that boards with more outside directors have more 
monitoring power. Under this assumption, an increase in managerial discretion, or a decrease in the level of other 
monitoring mechanisms, should cause a firm to increase the proportion of outside directors they place on their 
boards. Using this assumption, Myers, Shivdasani, and Smith (1997) find support for Williamson's substitution 
hypothesis; by contrast, Brickley and James (1987) do not. However, in a discussion of their empirical results, 
Brickley and James note that outside directors can be valuable to the firm for more than just their role as monitors. 
They concede that the underlying assumption in their study may be too restrictive. 
 
Despite the variety of functions performed by non-employee directors, their individual contributions have 
not been widely studied (Klein, 1998). In the finance literature, non-employee directors are commonly treated as a 
unified monitoring block, but the role of these so-called outside board members extends beyond that of 
T 
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disciplinarian. In addition to monitoring, outsider directors give advice on a variety of topics ranging from merger 
tactics to dealing with political processes (Mace, 1971; Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001). Outside directors can also serve 
a public relations role (Pfeffer, 1976). Indeed, Pfeffer (1976) and Basinger and Zardkoohi (1986) argue that prior to 
deregulation, electric utilities placed more outsiders on their boards than did their non-regulated counterparts in an 
attempt to co-opt influential members of the local community, not because electric utilities needed more intensive 
monitoring. 
 
This study adds to the growing literature that examines the evolution of corporate boards as a way of 
understanding the underlying factors that determine their size and level of independence (see, for example, Lehn, 
Patro, & Zhao, 2009; Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007). In addition, it extends work on the impact of 
deregulation on board structure by examining changes in various aspects of board character, as well as independence 
and size. In this paper, level of independence refers to the relative mix of inside and outside directors, and character 
refers to a more in-depth classification of directors that attempt to recognize the varied backgrounds, expertise, and 
affiliations of the outside directors serving on the board. 
 
This study is most closely related to Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) who assess the importance of political 
directors in a variety of industries, including the electric utility industry. The results in the paper support those of 
Agrawal and Knoeber for an extended sample of firms. The contribution of this paper is to assess the evolution of 
additional components of board character, which have been traditionally different from those of non-regulated firms. 
 
First, the board structure of electric utilities is compared at two different points in time - 1988, four years 
before the passage of the Energy Policy Act (EPACT), and 2000, eight years after the bill was passed.
1
 These 
univariate tests indicate significant changes in size, composition, and the character of utilities' boards. The boards 
become smaller and more independent because of a significant decrease in the number of insiders. Analysis of a 
more detailed breakdown of the outside directors reveals an increase in two classifications - executives of Fortune 
1000 corporations and, consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), ex-politicians. The numbers of directors in 
other classifications show little change. 
 
Both fixed and random effects multivariate Poisson regressions were used to check the robustness of the 
results. After controlling for firm size, performance, and CEO tenure (Hermalin & Wesibach, 1988; Coles, Daniel, & 
Naveen, 2008), the changes identified by the simple univariate comparisons remain significant under both the 
random and fixed effects regressions. 
 
Overall, the changes in board size, composition, and character are consistent with national trends in board 
size and composition (Lehn, Patro, & Zhao, 2009) and the view that firms adjust their boards in response to a change 
in their operating environment. As the hazards facing the residual claimants of electric utilities have changed, the 
board has been modified to address those hazards. The increased presence of Fortune 1000 executives on the boards 
of electric utilities suggests that utilities responded to the increased levels of CEO discretion and job complexity by 
placing executives, who have the background and experience to advise and monitor him, on their boards. Also, the 
increase in the number of ex-politicians serving on the boards of electric utilities is consistent with the heightened 
need of electric utilities for advice about and influence over the political process as the industry went through a 
period of deregulation. 
 
The next section provides more detail on the electric utility industry, highlighting the aspects of 
deregulation that have led to an increase in the challenges as well as the opportunities to be managed by electric 
utility executives. Subsequent sections include a discussion of factors that impact board size, composition, and 
character; the classification of directors, description of the data, and summary statistics for the board and the sample 
firms; the development of the multivariate regressions; a discussion of the results; and a conclusion. 
 
                                                          
1 The Energy Policy Act (EPACT), which passed into law in 1992, increased competition at the wholesale level by requiring electric utilities to 
move or "wheel" electricity along their transmission lines for any producer. In addition, the Act expanded the geographic reach of utilities by 
allowing them to purchase independent power producers anywhere in the US and also to purchase foreign power companies. Independent power 
producers are merely power generators; they have no infrastructure to transmit and distribute the power they produce. 
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INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
 
Introduction 
 
The electric utility industry was partially deregulated in the 1990’s. As a result, the once heavily regulated 
industry has been transformed. Prior to deregulation, homogeneous firms serviced captive customers in a restricted 
geographic territory. Following the passage of EPACT, partial deregulation enabled many of these entities to 
transform into diversified energy companies with non-regulated operations that span large regions of the country, or 
even the globe. This section highlights the major features of the more confining regulation as well as the deregulating 
events that caused the operating environment of electric utilities to change so much. For an encapsulated version of 
this discussion, see Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Impact of Deregulation on the Operating Environment of Electric Utilities 
 Pre EPACT Post EPACT 
Level of competition for wholesale electric power? Minimal Substantial 
Competition for electricity at the retail level? No No, but anticipated 
Electric utility monopoly over transmission lines? Yes Significantly reduced 
Utilities can build or acquire non-regulated generating plants anywhere in the 
county? 
No Yes 
Utilities can invest in or acquire foreign power companies? No Yes 
Market for electricity trading? No Yes 
Market for energy consulting? Minimal Expanded 
Regulatory hurdles for intra industry mergers?* Significant More Lenient 
Ability to merge utilities with non-contiguous operations?* No First approved 1997 
Ability for electric utilities to merge with gas companies that had interstate 
operations?* 
No First approved 1994 
Utilities concerned over who would pay for stranded costs? Somewhat Extremely 
* A relaxing of merger restrictions was not a provision of EPACT. Rather, in the early nineties, the SEC announced that they planned to interpret 
PUCHA more liberally when faced with future merger requests. Since the timing of the announcement coincides with the passage of EPACT, the 
more liberal interpretation of PUCHA is used for merger requests in the table. 
 
Background on Regulation 
 
For much of the past century, the electric utility industry was heavily regulated at both the federal and state 
levels. Federal policies limited utilities’ corporate structure, operating boundaries, and investment choices while state 
regulations set their geographic territories, governed their funding, limited the scope of their operations, and 
established what they could charge their retail customers. 
 
The Public Utilities Holding Company Act (PUHCA), enacted in 1935, is the primary federal regulation 
governing electric utilities. Under PUHCA, all subsidiaries of registered holding companies have to be run as a 
single, integrated system. Electric utilities owned by a holding company must be interconnected and the boundaries 
of the operation, as a whole, cannot extend over more than a few states (Energy Information Administration, 1993). 
In addition to the inter-industry limitations, PUHCA restricts any registered holding company from diversification 
into non-related businesses and prohibits investment in foreign power companies. 
 
For most of the last century, state regulators controlled the retail power markets. In 1877, Congress 
classified utilities as natural monopolies and gave them the right to operate without competition within specified 
geographic areas. To prevent utilities from abusing their monopolistic power, Congress authorized the states to set 
retail electricity rates. In addition, state regulations limited diversification for exempt holding companies operating 
within their borders. 
 
Deregulating Events and their Impact 
 
The operating environment for electric utilities began to change with the passage of the Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978, though its impact was limited. Few entities could take advantage of this 
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legislation, which introduced some new players into the generation business.
2
 It was not until the early 1990s that the 
major changes in utilities’ operating environment began. 
 
In 1992, the Energy Policy Act (EPACT) was passed into law. This legislation spurred competition at the 
wholesale level, establishing a new class of power generator, and it gave utility managers more discretion over the 
scope of their operations. Under EPACT, certain non-utilities - called electric wholesale generators (EWGs) - can 
generate power anywhere in the country, as long as they sell it wholesale. More notably, this legislation guarantees 
the EWGs access to the country’s transmission lines; utilities are now required to transmit wholesale power upon 
request and they must charge a fair price for the service. Moreover, this legislation opened up the wholesale 
generation business to electric utilities, which are now permitted to own and operate non-utility generation plants 
anywhere in the US (via non-regulated subsidiaries). In addition, the passage of EPACT increased utilities’ 
operational scope by allowing them to invest in foreign power companies. 
 
The provisions of EPACT affected the operating environment of electric utilities directly by increasing the 
scope and competitiveness of industry operations, and they also heralded further change. Expansion of the wholesale 
market for electricity spawned two new lines of business - electricity trading and energy consulting services. A string 
of subsequent events further removed or relaxed regulatory constraints on competition and operating scope.
3
 In the 
early 1990’s, utility executives were keenly aware that crucial political battles lay ahead of them. The most important 
of these were the federal and state decisions regarding stranded costs. 
 
Stranded costs are expenses incurred under a regulatory setting that would become unrecoverable under 
competition. Most utilities carried stranded costs exposure in the early 1990s (Electric Utilities Week, 1995). 
According to Moody’s, in 1993, all but eleven publicly traded electric utilities carried stranded costs on their books 
and about a third of them carried stranded costs that exceeded their outstanding equity. Consumer advocates argued 
that shareholders were responsible for these liabilities; utilities and shareholders argued that the costs should be 
passed on to consumers. Regulators had to make the final decision. Clearly, obtaining favorable rulings on who 
would bear the brunt of these costs was vital for the financial viability of most utilities. 
 
REGULATION, DEREGULATION, AND BOARD COMPOSITION 
 
The Impact of Regulation 
 
Earlier studies have examined the composition and character of electric utilities’ boards under regulation. 
Historically, these boards included more outsiders and lawyers that those of industrial firms (Pfeffer, 1976). Also, 
large utilities placed many local businessmen on their boards, in contrast to large industrial firms that typically 
selected executives of similarly sized firms as board members (Baysinger & Zardkoohi, 1986). Pffeffer (1976) and 
Baysinger and Zardkoohi (1986) argue that prior to deregulation, electric utilities were attempting to co-opt 
influential members of the local community. This was seen as a logical strategy because activism from local 
consumers in the public rate setting process could negatively impact a utility’s revenue. 
 
The Impact of Deregulation 
 
Aggrawal and Knoeber (1999) address the impact of deregulation on the board structure of electric utilities. 
They test whether the increased importance of political activism causes electric utilities to place additional ex-
politicians on their boards. Their results indicate a significant increase in such directors, suggesting that electric 
utilities placed additional value on political directors during a period of deregulation. 
                                                          
2 Certain types of entities, such as co-generators that produce power as a by-product of production, and independent power producers, were 
permitted to generate power for the wholesale power market. The wholesale price paid for their power was regulated and utilities were required to 
purchase it. 
3 For example, in September 1992, California became the first state to explore deregulation of electricity at the retail level. In September 1996, 
they enacted legislation to phase in retail competition beginning in 1998. As of August 1, 2001, twenty-two states had established laws designed 
to phase in competition for retail electricity sales over a three to ten-year period (eight of which have subsequently been suspended). Also, 
beginning in the early 1990s, the SEC has adopted a more liberal interpretation of PUHCA’s integration requirements in its review of merger 
requests. Non-contiguous utilities, as well as combination gas and electric companies from across state lines, have been permitted to merge. 
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Post EPACT, managers have increased discretion over their existing businesses and the scope of their 
operations has expanded functionally and geographically. As utility managers had increasing choice over the 
strategic direction of their utilities, and as the business of running a utility became more competitive and complex, 
then ceteris paribus, under Williamson’s hypothesis - the type of monitoring and the kind of advice these managers 
need - should be different from the optimum under more confining and limiting regulation. For an industry 
expanding into national and international markets, a director with experience and expertise in such markets could 
better evaluate the performance of the utility’s management and could offer more pertinent advice than a director that 
runs a small business rooted in a single state. Therefore, a test was performed to assess whether electric utilities 
increased the number of board members associated with large, national and international firms following partial 
deregulation. For classification purposes, firms listed on the Fortune 1000 were used (as well as private and foreign 
firms of equivalent size). 
 
CLASSIFICATION OF DIRECTORS, DATA, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Classification of Directors 
 
The most common classification of directors in academic studies differentiates insiders (those who work for 
the firm) and outsiders (those who do not work for the firm). In this paper, directors are first categorized as either 
insiders or outsiders and then an additional classification scheme is used to depict the character of the outside 
directors. The classifications are based on the backgrounds and affiliations of the individual directors. Table 2 shows 
a breakdown of the outside director classifications used for the study. They fall into four basic categories - Fortune 
executives, non-Fortune executive, service firm executives, and non-business directors. 
 
Table 2: Board Classification Scheme 
The board's composition is defined to be the mix of insider and outside directors, while the character of the outside directors is 
determined by the mix of directors in each of the following four classifications: Fortune executives, non-Fortune executives, 
service firm executives, and non-business directors. These director classifications are shown below along with a listing of the 
backgrounds and organizational affiliations of the directors included in each grouping. 
Composition Character Backgrounds and Affiliations of the Individual Directors 
Insiders   
Outsiders  
Fortune Executives Active and Retired Executives of Fortune 1000 non-service firms 
Non-Fortune Executives Active and Retired Executives of smaller, non-service firms 
Service Firm Executives 
Lawyers, Accountants, Commercial Bankers, Insurance Company 
Executives, Investment Bankers, Merchant Bankers, Venture Capitalists, 
Commodity, Brokers, Financial Service Professionals - Company Emphasis 
on Sales, Financial Analysts (Mutual Funds, Pension Plans, Investment 
Companies), Real Estate Executives, Business Consultants, PR Specialists 
Non-Business Director 
Academics, including Professors and Administrators, Authors, Clergy, Ex-
Military with no subsequent affiliation, Administrators for non-profits, Ex-
Politicians with no subsequent affiliation 
 
One additional classification is that of ex-politician. After leaving office, or for times between public 
service, these individuals pursue careers in a variety of fields. Therefore, in addition to the classification shown in 
Table 2, a director is also classified as an ex-politician if he or she has held an elected position in local, state, or 
federal politics or served in a regulatory capacity in the utility industry. 
 
Data Collection 
 
The sample consists of all publicly traded U.S. electric utilities for which sufficient data were available. The 
initial sample was comprised of all firms on Compustat with SIC codes of 4911 and 4931. After removing 25 records 
from an initial list of 132 - because they were not US electric utilities - 107 remained.
4
 Of the 107 firms, sufficient 
data were available for 93 of them. The eliminated firms were small and some experienced financial difficulty in the 
late 1980’s. 
                                                          
4 The eliminated firms included electric cooperatives, foreign power companies, and one independent power producer. 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – Third Quarter 2014 Volume 12, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 284 The Clute Institute 
To document changes in the character and composition of the firms’ boards, detailed information on their 
directors was collected. The years 1988 to 2000 were chosen because this allowed a comparison of board features 
for the four years prior to EPACT and for up to eight years following it. When possible, data were hand-collected 
from proxy statements via Lexis Nexis and Global Access. For the remainder of the sample, the data were drawn 
from microfiche copies of the proxy statements. On the rare occasion that a proxy statement was missing, the missing 
year data were interpolated by using the board member data listed in the subsequent proxy. 
 
In addition to board data, size and performance data for the sample firms were determined. Annual sales 
(normalized to year 2000 dollars) and firm assets (normalized to year 2000 dollars) listed on Compustat were used as 
a measure of firm size. To determine firm performance, the industry adjusted abnormal stock return in each year 
prior to the proxy year was calculated by subtracting the buy and hold firm return from the average buy and hold 
industry return. For this calculation, monthly return data from CRSP were used. 
 
Summary Statistics of Board Composition 
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for changes in board composition. It shows the mean, median, 
minimum, and maximum number of directors for each of the board classifications for proxy years 1988 and 2000. 
These results are generated from an unbalanced panel of data. Of the 93 firms in the original sample, twenty-four 
were acquired over the next thirteen years, leaving 69 firms in the year 2000. Since small- and medium-sized firms 
were the ones acquired, the changes noted for the unbalanced panel may simply reflect differences between the firms 
that remain and those that were left. This possibility was checked by comparing the board characteristics of the 69 
surviving firms in 1988 and 2000 using paired t-tests (not shown). The cell averages and levels of significance are 
almost identical to those found for the unbalanced panel. While this check suffers from a survivorship bias, it 
provides a robustness check of sorts for the results reported below. 
 
Table 3: Basic Summary Statistics for Each of the Director Classifications for 1988 and 2000 
The entire unbalanced sample is used. Over the thirteen-year period, the number of firms in the sample decreased from 93 to 
69. The difference of means tests evaluates whether the increase or decrease in mean value is significant.  
 
Data for 1988 
93 firms 
Data for 2000 
69 firms 
Difference of 
means test 
 Mean Median Range Mean Median Range p value 
Board Size 11.7 11.5 8 -18 11.2 11.0 7-17 0.104 
Number of Insiders 2.8 3 1-5 2.1 2 1-4 0.000 
Number of Outsiders 8.8 9 3-16 9.1 9 6-15 0.228 
Number of Fortune Executives 1.1 1 0-4 1.8 1 0-5 0.000 
Number of Non-Fortune Executives 3.0 3 0-8 2.8 3 0-6 0.241 
Number of Service Firm Executives 3.4 3 0-8 3.5 3 0-8 0.418 
Number of Non-Business 1.4 1 0-5 1.4 1 0-5 0.436 
Number of Ex-Politicians  0.4 0 0-2 0.9 1 0-3 0.000 
 
A difference of means test was used to assess changes in the number of board members in each category. 
For all but five of the classifications and sub-classifications, the mean number of directors serving on the boards 
changes very little (less than 0.1 per firm). The following discussion focuses on the five with an appreciable change. 
 
The average board size decreases from 11.7 in 1988 to 11.2 in 2000. This decrease results from a decrease in 
the number of insiders; the average number of insiders decreased from 2.8 to 2.1 over the period, while the average 
number of outsiders showed little change - from at 8.8 in 1988 and 9.1 in 2000. This result is consistent with changes 
in the size of utilities boards found by Rennie (2006). A reduction in the number of insiders serving on the boards of 
electric utilities is consistent with the general overall trend of fewer insiders serving on boards of US corporations. 
This trend began in the 1960’s when boards of large US firms were staffed with more insiders than outsiders 
(Baysinger & Butler, 1986). A gradual decline has persisted ever since (Lehn, Patro, & Zhao, 2009). As of the late 
1990’s, the boards of most large US corporations were staffed with only one or two insiders (Bhagat & Black, 1999). 
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The average number of Fortune executives serving on the boards of electric utilities increased from 1.1 in 
1988 to 1.8 in 2000 (see Table 3). A t-test of an increase in the mean indicates that this change is significant (p = 
0.000). While not shown in the table, the increase in Fortune executives is gradual over the period 1988-2000. The 
increase in the average number of Fortune executives is somewhat balanced by a decrease in the average number of 
non-Fortune executives - from 3.0 to 2.8. However, this decrease is not statistically significant (p = 0.241). 
 
Finally, consistent with the work of Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), the results show a significant increase in 
the average number of ex-politicians serving on the boards of electric utilities - from 0.4 to 0.9 (p = 0.000).
5
 These 
changes are consistent with the view that firms will modify the character of their boards in response to a change in 
their operating environment. 
 
Firm Characteristics 
 
On a univariate basis, there are statistically significant changes in the composition and character of the 
boards of electric utilities. One potential reason for the changes is the overall increase in firm size.
6
 As shown in 
Table 4 Panel A, average firm sales (shown in year 2000 dollars) have increased from $2.4 billion in 1988 to $4.4 
billion in 2000 (p = 0.000) and total assets (in year 2000 dollars) increased from $6.7 billion in 1988 to $9.8 billion 
in 2000 (p = 0.009) for the unbalanced panel. In the following section, controls were used for these changes by 
including firm size - proxied by the log of sales and log of assets (not shown) - using multivariate Poisson 
regressions. Results for the balanced panel (see Table 4 Panel B) show similar results. 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Firm Size and Board Member Tenure for the Years 1988 and 2000 
Panel A presents the data for the unbalanced panel of 93 and 69 firms, respectively, while Panel B presents the data for the balanced 
panel of 69 firms. Size is measured by firm sales and firm assets in constant 2000 dollars. The average tenure figures shown in 
parentheses for the year 2000 include any time served on an acquired (or merged) firm's boards. The difference of means tests 
evaluates whether the increase or decrease in mean value is significant.  
Panel A 
 
Data for 1988 
93 firms 
Data for 2000 
69 firms 
Difference of 
means test 
Mean Median Range Mean Median Range p value 
Firm Sales ($Millions) $2,355 $1,470 $72 - $10,887 $4,422 $2,797 $70 - $22,461 0.000 
Firm Assets ($Millions) $6,666 $3.720 $74 - $31,636 $9,805 $6,608 $172 - $40,741 0.009 
Tenure – Insiders 8.3 8.6 0.5 - 21.0 
9.0 
(9.6) 
8.5 
(9.3) 
2.0 - 18.0 
(2.0-18.0) 
0.161 
Tenure – Outsiders 7.9 7.9 2.9 - 15.7 
8.8 
(9.4) 
8.7 
(9.0) 
4.5 - 15.0 
(4.8 – 15.0) 
0.040 
Panel B 
 Data for 1988 
69 firms 
Data for 2000 
69 firms 
Difference of 
means test 
Mean Median Range Mean Median Range p value 
Firm Sales ($Millions) $2,692 $1,778 $72 - $10,887 $4,422 $2,797 $70 - $22,461 0.007 
Firm Assets ($Millions) $7,519 $4,312 $74 - $31,636 $9,805 $6,608 $172 - $40,741 0.073 
Tenure – Insiders 8.3 7.7 0.5 - 21.0 
9.0 
(9.6) 
8.5 
(9.3) 
2.0 - 18.0 
(2.0-18.0) 
0.186 
Tenure – Outsiders 8.3 7.7 2.9 - 15.7 
8.8 
(9.4) 
8.7 
(9.0) 
4.5 - 15.0 
(4.8 – 15.0) 
0.039 
 
The discussion so far has focused on whether the composition and character of utilities boards have 
changed. A related question asks whether the pace of board member turnover has changed. In other words, has the 
change in operating environment resulted in an active reconfiguration of electric utility boards or have electric 
                                                          
5 Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) found that the average number of ex-politicians serving on the boards of electric utilities increased from 0.51 in 
1988 to 0.77 in 1999. 
6 The electric utility industry has consolidated and electric utilities have expanded in scope. The number of publicly traded firms listed on 
Compustat has decreased from 107 to 84 over this period. The shock of partial deregulation, along with a more liaise faire interpretation of the 
merger guidelines by the SEC relating to electric utility mergers and the combination of electric and gas companies, led to a flurry of merger 
activity in the mid to late 1990s. In addition, the passage of EPACT has permitted to increase the scope of their operations to include investment 
in foreign power companies and non-regulated independent power plants.  As a result, the average firm size in the industry increased. 
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utilities waited for the incumbent board members to retire before replacing them? One indication of the pace of 
change in board composition is to look at the average tenure of the board members. A decrease in the average tenure 
would suggest that the pace of board turnover has quickened. 
 
Table 4 Panel A shows the changes in average tenure for both inside and outside directors for the 
unbalanced panel. The average tenure for inside directors has increased from 8.3 in 1988 to 9.0 in 2000, though this 
increase is not significant. This change may be due to the reduction in the average number of inside directors. Since 
electric utilities have reduced insider representation on boards to an average of 1.7, these insiders are usually one or 
two of the following: the COO, the CEO or the Chairman (who is the retired CEO). These officers traditionally have 
longer board tenure than other inside director types. 
 
More surprising is the result that the average tenure for outside directors has increased significantly. This 
result suggests that deregulation did not lead to a shake-up of utilities' boards. Instead, the opposite occurred. Mean 
tenure for outside board members increased from 7.9 years in 1988 to 8.8 years in 2000 (p = 0.040). This result does 
not indicate that firms actively reconfigure their boards in response to a change in their operating environment. 
Results for the balanced panel (see Table 4 Panel B) show similar results. 
 
A potential explanation for the increase in average tenure of outside directors is that knowledge of the firm 
and the industry are important in this industry during a period of rapid change. Utilities may have chosen to retain 
some directors with firm and industry knowledge rather than replacing them all with directors who may know little 
about the industry. This explanation is consistent with the findings of Hadlock, Lee, and Parrino (2002) regarding 
utility CEOs. They find that electric utilities hire relatively few CEOs from outside the company. In the few cases 
where they do, new CEOs are recruited from other electric utilities or from the ranks of the outside board members 
of the electric utility (as in the case of Tucson Electric Power in 1990). This suggests that knowledge of the power 
business and the local operating environment may be important for both managers and directors in this industry. 
 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS – NUMBER OF DIRECTORS IN EACH CATEGORY 
 
Poisson Regressions 
 
The univariate statistics from the prior section suggest that electric utilities responded to the increased scope 
and complexity in their environment by increasing the number of Fortune executives on their boards. However, these 
tests also show that that average firm size increased substantially over the same period. To check that the change in 
board character and composition are not driven by firm size or other potentially confounding factors, changes in 
board classifications were tested using random and fixed effects multivariate Poisson regressions. Such regressions 
are commonly used for analyzing board data.
7
 
 
In addition to the primary analysis and evaluating the impact of deregulation on the number of Fortune 
executives and the number of ex-politicians placed on utility's boards, any changes in the other board classifications 
were documented as well. This analysis can confirm that apart from a decrease in the number of insiders and 
increases in the number of Fortune 100 directors and political directors, the number of directors in all other director 
categories does not change. Moreover, these regressions identify factors other than deregulation that impact the 
composition and character of the boards of electric utilities. 
 
Both random and fixed effects regressions were run. Using the two methods makes it possible to tease out 
certain types of information. For example, using random effects regression can show whether the board composition 
of larger firms differs from that of smaller firms. By contrast, using fixed effects regressions can show whether an 
increase in firm size for a given firm has an impact on board composition and character. Random effects regressions 
were run for both the unbalanced panel (with 93 firms in 1988 that reduced to 69 in 2000) and the balanced sample 
of 69 firms. The results are not substantially different, so the regressions are reported for the unbalanced sample 
only. 
 
                                                          
7 For example, see Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), Klein (1998), and Agrawal and Knoeber (2001). 
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Utilities may be unable to reconfigure their boards immediately. To account for a potential lag in reaction 
time, the years 1988-2000 are not included in the regressions. About half the firms in this sample have staggered 
boards; if utilities choose to reconfigure their boards, it could take them at least three years to do so. For this reason, 
Poisson regressions for years 1988-1991 and 1997-2000 were used. This captures four years in a more regulated 
period and four years during the partial deregulation period. 
 
The dependent variables in the Poisson regressions are the number of directors in each of the director 
classifications serving on the board of a given firm in a given year. The primary independent variable of interest is a 
deregulation dummy set to one for years 1997-2000. In addition, economic theory and the results of prior work on 
board composition were used to select control variables for the regressions. 
 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find that outsiders are added to boards following poor performance. Since 
their result suggests that recent poor performance may be correlated with a greater number of outside directors, the 
prior year industry adjusted abnormal return is included, using monthly return data obtained from CRSP. Firms may 
add inside directors toward the end of a CEO's tenure, either to give them increased exposure to the board as part of 
a CEO selection process (Mace, 1971) or because a CEO with greater tenure has more power over the CEO selection 
process and he is more likely to choose insiders (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1997). Outsiders are more likely to be 
added early in a CEO's tenure when he is less powerful. CEO tenure is included in the regressions to control for these 
possible effects. Firm size is included because it has also been related to director choice (Pfeffer, 1976; Klein, 1998). 
Finally, since the dependent variable is the number of each classification of directors, board size in any given year is 
also included as a control variable. 
 
Random Effects – Results 
 
As shown in Table 5, the random effects Poison regressions produce similar results to the univariate 
analysis. Deregulation is related to a significant decrease in the number of insiders (t = 3.94) and significant increase 
in the number of Fortune executives (t = 4.38) and ex-politicians (t = 5.10). 
 
Table 5: Poisson Regressions - Random Effects 
Number of Directors by Type 
This table presents the results of Poisson random effects regressions where the dependent variable is the number of directors 
for each director class. The unbalanced panel of 93 to 69 firms consists of data for the years 1988-1991and 1997-2000, where 
the later period represents the period of deregulation. A deregulation dummy is used for the years 1997-2000. LY ABRET is 
the industry-adjusted abnormal stock return for the year prior to the one used to obtain the board data. Log of Sales is a proxy 
for the size of the firm; this independent variable is the log of sales in year 2000 dollars. CEO tenure is calculated in years as 
of the date of the current year proxy. T statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Variable Insiders Outsiders 
Fortune 
Executives 
Non-
Fortune 
Executives 
Service 
Firm 
Executives 
Non-
Business 
Directors 
Ex-
Politicians 
Deregulation 
-.2485 
(-3.94) 
.0679 
(2.57) 
.3305 
(4.38) 
.0472 
(0.98) 
.0194 
(0.36) 
.0190 
(0.26) 
.5486 
(5.10) 
LY ABRET 
-.2415 
(-1.38) 
.0467 
(0.51) 
-.0116 
(-0.05) 
.0855 
(0.66) 
.1511 
(0.99) 
.0104 
(0.06) 
.1059 
(0.39) 
Log of Sales 
.0338 
(1.02) 
-.0050 
(-0.38) 
.3578 
(4.39) 
-.1476 
(-3.46) 
-.0001 
(-0.97) 
.2404 
(3.24) 
.2405 
(2.16) 
CEO tenure 
.0002 
(0.03) 
-.0010 
(-0.33) 
.0038 
(0.43) 
-.0085 
(-1.44) 
-.0021 
(-0.32) 
.0110 
(1.32) 
-.0120 
(-1.00) 
Board Size 
.0506 
(3.6) 
.0885 
(15.40) 
.0684 
(3.39) 
.0896 
(6.26) 
.0989 
(6.69) 
.0869 
(4.36) 
.0989 
(3.15) 
Constant 
.1304 
(0.53) 
1.174 
(12.68) 
-3.441 
(-5.65) 
1.050 
(3.79) 
.0747 
(0.40) 
-2.564 
(-4.73) 
-3.697 
(-4.30) 
No. of Observations 687 687 569 687 392 613 443 
Wald 
2
  42.39 297.88 66.49 43.29 46.35 43.53 46.04 
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As expected, firm size has a substantial impact on the composition and character of the boards of electric 
utilities. First, size is negatively related to the number of non-Fortune executives that utilities place on their boards (t 
= 3.46). This result has a plausible explanation. It seems reasonable that small firms will choose more executives 
from small firms as board members and vice versa. 
 
Firm size is positively related to the number of Fortune executives (t = 4.39), the number of non-business 
executives (t = 3.24), and the number of ex-politicians (t = 2.16) on the boards of electric utilities. Larger firms may 
be in a stronger position to attract Fortune executives and ex-politicians to their boards, though they probably have 
less need for specialized financial advice since they already have teams of such experts on staff. Instead, larger firms 
may seek increased legitimacy by placing consumer advocates and academics on their boards. 
 
Fixed Effects – Results 
 
The results of the fixed effects models provide additional constraints on the data and, not surprisingly, they 
produce less significant results (see Table 6). However, the primary results of the univariate analysis do hold over to 
the fixed effects model. There is a significant decrease in the number of insiders (t = 3.66) and a significant increase 
in the number of Fortune executives (t = 4.74) and ex-politicians (t = 4.85) serving on the boards of electric utilities 
subsequent to deregulation. One result here is particularly informative; namely, the impact of firm size on the number 
of outside directors. In the random effects model, firm size is positively related to the number of Fortune executives. 
By contrast under the fixed effects model, no such relationship exists. This suggests that while larger firms tend to 
hire more Fortune executives overall, an increase in firm size for the average firm within the sample does not lead to 
an increase in the number of Fortune executives serving on the board. 
 
Table 6: Poisson Regressions - Fixed Effects 
Number of Directors by Type 
This table presents the results of Poisson fixed effects regressions where the dependent variable is the number of directors for 
each director class. The unbalanced panel of 93 to 69 firms consists of data for the years 1988-1991 and 1997-2000, where the 
latter period represents the period of deregulation. A deregulation dummy is used for the years 1997-2000. LY ABRET is the 
industry-adjusted abnormal stock return for the year prior to the one used to obtain the board data. Log of Sales is a proxy for 
the size of the firm; this independent variable is the log of sales in year 2000 dollars. CEO tenure is calculated in years as of 
the date of the current year proxy. T statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Variable Insiders Outsiders 
Fortune 
Executives 
Non-
Fortune 
Executives 
Service 
Firm 
Executives 
Non-
Business 
Directors 
Ex-
Politicians 
Deregulation 
.2231 
(-3.66) 
.5021 
(1.68) 
.3906 
(4.74) 
-.0062 
(-0.11) 
-.0304 
(-0.22) 
.0718 
(0.90) 
.5587 
(4.85) 
LY ABRET 
-.1332 
(-0.86) 
.0439 
(0.56) 
.0075 
(10.03) 
.0762 
(0.58) 
.1001 
(0.30) 
.0019 
(0.10) 
.1882 
(0.69) 
Log of Sales 
-.0183 
(1.18) 
.0391 
(0.67) 
.1725 
(1.14) 
.0469 
(0.44) 
.2998 
(1.11) 
.0941 
(0.59) 
.1820 
(1.85) 
CEO tenure 
-0.010 
(-0.16) 
.0001 
(0.03) 
.0035 
(0.38) 
-.0058 
(-.095) 
.0074 
(0.49) 
.0117 
(1.34) 
-.0120 
(-0.98) 
Board Size 
.0658 
(3.64) 
.0829 
(9.00) 
.0703 
(3.22) 
.0840 
(4.87) 
.1191 
(2.90) 
.0980 
(4.46) 
.0866 
(2.56) 
No. of Observations 687 687 569 687 392 613 443 
Wald 
2
  44.54 86.44 40.47 26.07 11.92 24.82 36.75 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper evaluates the impact of deregulation on the board structure of electric utilities. In most studies of 
board structure, the measure of interest is board composition, or the relative mix of inside and outside directors. 
However, prior studies that compare corporate board structure in different operating environments suggest that a 
more in-depth classification of corporate boards is warranted. What makes the study of the electric utility industry 
useful in this regard is that the specific shocks transforming the industry make it possible to predict desirable changes 
in the characteristics of those serving on utility’s boards. 
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The results show that electric utilities gradually changed the character of their boards in a way that is 
consistent with their economic needs, by increasing the number of directors in two key categories. As their 
operations increased in scope and became more complex, electric utilities increased the number of executives from 
large firms that serve on their boards. In addition, during a time when political activism is particularly important, 
they placed more ex-politicians on their boards. 
 
Overall, the results of this study corroborate with the view of Fama and Jensen (1983) that corporations pay 
attention to both the composition and the character of their boards. Moreover, the results support Williamson’s 
hypothesis that firms react to a change in operating environment by reconfiguring their board structure. 
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